Omar al-Bayoumi is a Saudi national who allegedly befriended two of the 9/11 hijackers in the United States. Saudi Arabia firmly maintains that al-Bayoumi is not an agent of theirs. Bayoumi was listed before 9/11 in FBI files as being a Saudi agent.
From the 9/11 secret report release 15 July 2016
– Omar al-Bayoumi. The FBI has received numerous reports from individuals tn the
Muslim community, dating back to 1999, alleging that al-Bayoumi may be a Saudi
intelligence officer. FBI files suggeSt that al-Bayoumi provided substantial assistance to
hijackers Khaiid al-Mihdiiar and Nawaf al-Hazmi after they arrived in San Diego in
February 2001. Al-Bayounu met the hijackers at a public place shortly after his meeting
with an individual at the Saudi consulate and there are indications in the files that his
encounter with the hijackers may not have been accidental. During this same timeframe,
al-Bayoumi had extensive Contact with Saudi Government establishments the United
States and received financial support from a Saudi company affiliated with the Saudi
Ministry of Defense. According to FBI files,- at the company said that al-
Bayoutni received a salary even though he had been there on only one occasion
This support increased substantially in April 2000, two months after the hijackers arrived
in San Diego. decreased in December 2000. and Stayed at thru same level until
August 2001. That company reportedly had ties to Usama Bin Ladin and Al-Qaeda. in
addition. the FBI determined that al-Bayounti Was in contact with several individuals
under FBI investigation and with The Holy Land Foundation, which has been under
investigation as a fundraising source for llamas;
New York Times from 911 report
Omar Al-Bayoumi: Al-Bayoumi, a Saudi national, provided September 11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Kahlid al-Mihdharwith considerable assistance after the hijackers arrived in San Diego in February 2000. He helped them locate an apartment, co-signed their lease, and ordered Mohdhar Abdullah (discussed below) to provide them with whatever assistance they needed in acclimating to the United States. The FBI now believes that in January 2000 al-Bayoumi met with Fahad al-Thumairy, a Saudi diplomat and cleric, at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles before going to the restaurant where he met the hijackers and engaged them in conversation. Whether or not al-Bayomi’s meeting with the hijackers was accidental or arranged is still the subject of debate. During his conversation with the hijackers, Al-Bayoumi invited them to move to San Diego, which they did shortly thereafter. Al-Bayoumi has extensive ties to the Saudi Government and may in the local Muslim community in San Diego believed that he was a Saudi intelligence officer. The FBI believes it is possible that he was an agent of the Saudi Government and that he may have been reporting on the local community to Saudi Government officials. In addition, during its investigation the FBI discovered that al-Bayoumi has ties to terrorists elements as well.
From the 2013 FBI files
One resident of the complex, linked to al-Bayoumi, was a Saudi citizen who hosted a party for “The Blind Sheikh” Omar Abdel Rahman in October 1992. The same resident
was “determined to have known Osama Bin Laden’s family in Saudi Arabia and to have telephonic contact with members of Bin Laden’s family who are currently in the U.S.”
A telephone link also connected a resident with Anwar Aulaqi, then-leader of the Dar El-Hijra mosque in Falls Church, Virginia and “determined… to have been the spiritual leader for hijacker Nawaf Al-Hazmi.”
Al-Midhar and Al-Hazmi briefly lived with Bayoumi before moving into the nearby Parkwood Apartment complex, where Bayoumi also moved.
“According to the apartment manager of the Parkwood Apartments, Al-Bayoumi occasionally paid rent for Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar.”
Evidence was found supporting the possibility that Bayoumi was affiliated with the Saudi intelligence service. The FBI redacted details of that evidence.
Another individual who apparently moved into the Parkwood complex may have “succeeded Omar AI-Bayoumi and may be undertaking activities on behalf of the Government of Saudi Arabia.”
Bayoumi or one of his associates “has had telephonic contact with Anwar N. Aulaqi,” the memo reads. “Aulaqi is the Imam of a mosque in Falls Church, Virginia and is believed to have been the spiritual leader of hijacker Nawaf AI-Hazmi.”
New York Post 15 DEcember 2015
The Saudis deny any role in 9/11, but the CIA in one memo reportedly found “incontrovertible evidence” that Saudi government officials — not just wealthy Saudi hardliners, but high-level diplomats and intelligence officers employed by the kingdom — helped the hijackers both financially and logistically. The intelligence files cited in the report directly implicate the Saudi embassy in Washington and consulate in Los Angeles in the attacks, making 9/11 not just an act of terrorism, but an act of war.
The findings, if confirmed, would back up open-source reporting showing the hijackers had, at a minimum, ties to several Saudi officials and agents while they were preparing for their attacks inside the United States. In fact, they got help from Saudi VIPs from coast to coast:
LOS ANGELES: Saudi consulate official Fahad al-Thumairy allegedly arranged for an advance team to receive two of the Saudi hijackers — Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi — as they arrived at LAX in 2000. One of the advance men, Omar al-Bayoumi, a suspected Saudi intelligence agent, left the LA consulate and met the hijackers at a local restaurant. (Bayoumi left the United States two months before the attacks, while Thumairy was deported back to Saudi Arabia after 9/11.)
SAN DIEGO: Bayoumi and another suspected Saudi agent, Osama Bassnan, set up essentially a forward operating base in San Diego for the hijackers after leaving LA. They were provided rooms, rent and phones, as well as private meetings with an American al Qaeda cleric who would later become notorious, Anwar al-Awlaki, at a Saudi-funded mosque he ran in a nearby suburb. They were also feted at a welcoming party. (Bassnan also fled the United States just before the attacks.)
WASHINGTON: Then-Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar and his wife sent checks totaling some $130,000 to Bassnan while he was handling the hijackers. Though the Bandars claim the checks were “welfare” for Bassnan’s supposedly ill wife, the money nonetheless made its way into the hijackers’ hands.
Other al Qaeda funding was traced back to Bandar and his embassy — so much so that by 2004 Riggs Bank of Washington had dropped the Saudis as a client.
The next year, as a number of embassy employees popped up in terror probes, Riyadh recalled Bandar.
“Our investigations contributed to the ambassador’s departure,” an investigator who worked with the Joint Terrorism Task Force in Washington told me, though Bandar says he left for “personal reasons.”
FALLS CHURCH, VA.: In 2001, Awlaki and the San Diego hijackers turned up together again — this time at the Dar al-Hijrah Islamic Center, a Pentagon-area mosque built with funds from the Saudi Embassy. Awlaki was recruited 3,000 miles away to head the mosque. As its imam, Awlaki helped the hijackers, who showed up at his doorstep as if on cue. He tasked a handler to help them acquire apartments and IDs before they attacked the Pentagon.
Awlaki worked closely with the Saudi Embassy. He lectured at a Saudi Islamic think tank in Merrifield, Va., chaired by Bandar. Saudi travel itinerary documents I’ve obtained show he also served as the official imam on Saudi Embassy-sponsored trips to Mecca and tours of Saudi holy sites.
Most suspiciously, though, Awlaki fled the United States on a Saudi jet about a year after 9/11.
As I first reported in my book, “Infiltration,” quoting from classified US documents, the Saudi-sponsored cleric was briefly detained at JFK before being released into the custody of a “Saudi representative.” A federal warrant for Awlaki’s arrest had mysteriously been withdrawn the previous day. A US drone killed Awlaki in Yemen in 2011.
HERNDON, VA.: On the eve of the attacks, top Saudi government official Saleh Hussayen checked into the same Marriott Residence Inn near Dulles Airport as three of the Saudi hijackers who targeted the Pentagon. Hussayen had left a nearby hotel to move into the hijackers’ hotel. Did he meet with them? The FBI never found out. They let him go after he “feigned a seizure,” one agent recalled. (Hussayen’s name doesn’t appear in the separate 9/11 Commission Report, which clears the Saudis.)
SARASOTA, FLA.: 9/11 ringleader Mohamed Atta and other hijackers visited a home owned by Esam Ghazzawi, a Saudi adviser to the nephew of King Fahd. FBI agents investigating the connection in 2002 found that visitor logs for the gated community and photos of license tags matched vehicles driven by the hijackers. Just two weeks before the 9/11 attacks, the Saudi luxury home was abandoned. Three cars, including a new Chrysler PT Cruiser, were left in the driveway. Inside, opulent furniture was untouched.
Democrat Bob Graham, the former Florida senator who chaired the Joint Inquiry, has asked the FBI for the Sarasota case files, but can’t get a single, even heavily redacted, page released. He says it’s a “coverup.”
from the 2 august 2003 New York times
People familiar with the report and who spoke on condition of not being named said that the two Saudi citizens, Omar al-Bayoumi and Osama Bassnan, operated in a complex web of financial relationships with officials of the Saudi government. The sections that focus on them draw connections between the two men, two hijackers, and Saudi officials.
The report urges further investigation of the two men and their contacts with the hijackers, because of unresolved questions about their relationship and whether they had any involvement in the 9/11 plot.
The edited 28-page section of the report, produced by a joint panel of the House and Senate intelligence committees, also says that a Muslim cleric in San Diego was a central figure in a support network that aided the same two hijackers. Most connections drawn in the report between the men, Saudi intelligence and the attacks are circumstantial, several people who have read the report said.
The unclassified parts of the report also suggest a connection between Mr. al-Bayoumi and Saudi intelligence. The report says that ”one of the F.B.I.’s best sources in San Diego informed the F.B.I. that he thought that al-Bayoumi must be an intelligence officer.” The report also says that ”despite the fact that he was a student, al-Bayoumi had access to seemingly unlimited funding from Saudi Arabia.”
The joint inquiry’s investigation of Mr. al-Bayoumi and Mr. Bassnan centered on their activities three years ago when they were living in San Diego. The report concluded that the two men were crucial to understanding the events leading up to the plot, largely because of Mr. al-Bayoumi’s extensive contacts with two of the 9/11 hijackers, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, after they settled in San Diego in early 2000. There is no definitive evidence that Mr. Bassnan knew the hijackers, but the report describes him as a close associate of Mr. al-Bayoumi.
One unresolved issue in the classified part of the report concerned Mr. Bassnan’s visit to Houston after the attacks. While Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah met with President Bush, Mr. Bassnan met with a Saudi in his entourage, according to the report. It is not known what they discussed.
In San Diego, Mr. al-Bayoumi was employed by a contractor to the Saudi civil aviation authority, and received payments authorized by a Saudi official. But Congressional officials believe he was a ”ghost employee” of the contractor who did no actual work. The payments authorized by the Saudi official increased significantly after Mr. al-Bayoumi came in contact with the two hijackers in early 2000, the classified part of the report states.
According to the unclassified parts of the report, Mr. al-Bayoumi first befriended Mr. al-Mihdhar and Mr. al-Hazmi in January 2000 when they arrived in Los Angeles from Bangkok, after attending a meeting in Malaysia with other operatives of al Qaeda. The two men stayed in Mr. al-Bayoumi’s apartment for several days. He helped them find their own apartment, paid their first month’s rent and security deposit, and threw a party to help them get settled in the local Arabic community.
Law enforcement officials have said, though, that Mr. Almidhar repaid Mr. al-Bayoumi and added that there was no evidence Mr. al-Bayoumi or Mr. Bassnan ever provided any other money to Mr. Almidhar or Mr. Hazmi. That point, the officials said, helps to explain why Mr. al-Bayoumi has not been accused of any crime, like providing material support to terrorists.
Law enforcement officials have played down the significance of the connection between Mr. al-Bayoumi and the two hijackers, saying there is no evidence that Mr. al-Bayoumi knew of the 9/11 plot. They dismissed the tone of the report, which they say portrays the possible links between the plot and Saudi Arabian officials as clearer and more direct than is actually known.
F.B.I. and C.I.A. officials have also said that they are not certain why Mr. al-Bayoumi was in San Diego, and that they are not certain of his exact relationship with the Saudi government. Some officials said that even if he was not a professional Saudi intelligence officer, he may have had some informal role. It is possible, they believe, that he was assigned to monitor the activities of Saudi students and other expatriates in the United States.
Investigators said that the role of the Muslim cleric who the report says served as a ”spiritual adviser” to the two hijackers is central to an understanding of what happened in San Diego. The cleric is not named in the declassified section of the report, but officials identified him as Anwar Aulaqi. He is said to have held meetings with the two hijackers, and when he moved to Falls Church, Va., in 2001, the two hijackers moved as well and began to attend the mosque with which the cleric was now associated. Officials said that the report made clear that the cleric’s role needs to be investigated further.
from the 15 july 2016 intercept
“While in the United States, some of the September 11th hijackers were in contact with or received assistance from, individuals who may be connected with the Saudi government,” reads the report, which added that FBI sources believed at least two of those individuals were Saudi intelligence agents.
The report also mentions that numbers found in the phonebook of Abu Zubaydah, a detainee currently held in Guantánamo, could be traced to a company in Denver, Colorado, connected to former Saudi ambassador to the U.S. Prince Bandar bin Sultan.
One of the most notable figures mentioned is Omar al-Bayoumi, alleged by the report to have likely been a Saudi intelligence agent. Al-Bayoumi was in close contact with hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Midhar, providing them financial assistance during their time in the United States and even helping them find an apartment. Bayoumi in turn is believed to have been on the payroll of the Saudi Ministry of Defense and was regularly in receipt of large lump sums of money from the Saudi Ministry of Finance and other undisclosed arms of the government.
Another figure highlighted in the documents is Osama Bassnan, a Saudi citizen who was an associate of al-Bayoumi and lived in an apartment nearby al-Hazmi and al-Midhar. According to the report, Bassnan “made a comment to an FBI source after the attacks suggesting that he did more for the hijackers than al-Bayoumi did.” Bassnan and his wife received regular payments from the wife of Bandar bin Sultan. On one occasion, Bassnan is said to have received a check directly from Bandar’s account.
Fahd al-Thumairy, a former Saudi consular officer in the United States who served as an imam at a mosque attended by al-Hazmi and al-Midhar, is also mentioned briefly, as is Saleh al-Hussayen, who is described in the report as a “Saudi Interior Ministry employee/official.” Al-Hussayen stayed at the same hotel as one of the hijackers in the days before the attack. While being interviewed by FBI agents after the attacks, al-Hussayen “either passed out or feigned a seizure,” causing the interview to be terminated. He later managed to successfully flee the country.
Referencing a May 1996 Director of Central Intelligence memo, the report cited agency beliefs that “the Saudis had stopped providing background information or other assistance on Bin Ladin because Bin Ladin had ‘too much information about official Saudi dealings with Islamic extremists in the 1980s for Riyadh to deliver him into U.S. hands.’”
from the 1 december 2002 Newsweek
When the two Qaeda operatives arrived at Los Angeles International Airport around New Year’s 2000, they were warmly welcomed. Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar would help hijack American Airlines Flight 77 and crash it into the Pentagon a year and a half later, but that January in Los Angeles, they were just a couple of young Saudi men who barely spoke English and needed a place to stay. At the airport, they were swept up by a gregarious fellow Saudi, Omar al-Bayoumi, who had been living in the United States for several years. Al-Bayoumi drove the two men to San Diego, threw a welcoming party and arranged for the visitors to get an apartment next to his. He guaranteed the lease, and plunked down $1,550 in cash to cover the first two months’ rent. His hospitality did not end there.
Al-Bayoumi also aided Alhazmi and Almihdhar as they opened a bank account, and recruited a friend to help them obtain Social Security cards and call flight schools in Florida to arrange flying lessons, according to law-enforcement officials. Two months before 9-11, al-Bayoumi moved to England; several months later, he disappeared. He is believed to be somewhere in Saudi Arabia.
Who is al-Bayoumi? At various times, the affable father of four told people that he was getting his doctorate at San Diego State, though the school has no record he ever attended. He told others that he was a pilot for the Saudi national airline. He apparently did work for Dallah Avco, an aviation-services company with extensive contracts with the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation, headed by Prince Sultan, the father of the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar. According to informed sources, some federal investigators suspect that al-Bayoumi could have been an advance man for the 9-11 hijackers, sent by Al Qaeda to assist the plot that ultimately claimed 3,000 lives.
From the Guardian 14 May 2016
Fahad al-Thumairy, a 32-year-old Imam and former Saudi diplomat deported from the US in 2003 because of suspected terrorist links, was questioned in Saudi Arabia by members of the 9/11 Commission in February 2004.
A member of Commission staff later said “it was so clear Thumairy was lying,” according toThe Guardian. “It was also so clear he was dangerous.” It is also reported that the investigators described the scene as “chilling”.
When confronted with evidence of numerous phone calls between himself and Omar al-Bayoumi, a Saudi national who allegedly befriended two of the 9/11 hijackers, al-Thumairy denied any knowledge of Mr al-Bayoumi.
The document states that when Mr al-Thumairy was presented with more confrontational questions during the interrogation, “his posture changed noticeably”.
Mr al-Thumairy is said to have crossed his arms, sat back in his chair and relied more heavily on the interpreter when questioned about his connections to two Saudi hijackers who had lived in southern California before 9/11.
The interviews were conducted between 2002 to 2004 by the 9/11 Commission, set up to investigate the circumstances of the attacks. They have now been published by the National Archives.
According to notes from an interview, members of the Islamic Council of the Saudi government said: “Funds were probably misused. Saudis have an obligation to give to charity. People don’t ask questions about where the money goes.”
“We used our money. But we did not want our money to be used to attack the USA, or to be turned against us.”
An interview with Mr al-Bayoumi is also listed within the memos, in which he “agreed that he had some telephone contact with al-Thumairy, which involved discussion of [al-Bayoumi’s] questions on religious matters”.
The document states that Mr al-Bayoumi “considered al-Thumairy his religious advisor”, but denied that he was ever his teacher, and “expressed surprise that he might have held a position at the Consulate”.
Both Mr al-Thumairy and Mr al-Bayoumi deny any links to terrorists.
From 12 February Judical Watch
Judicial Watch announced today that it has obtained 79 pages of investigative reports from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) providing further evidence of ties between terrorist leaders Anwar al-Aulaqi and Omar al-Bayoumi, the government of Saudi Arabia, and FBI and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) counter-terrorism investigations in the days leading up to the 9-11 terrorist attack.
Included in the new documents are dozens of pages of a case-establishing “Letterhead Memorandum” from the FBI’s Washington headquarters and San Diego field office. Limited portions of some of the memos had been previously released, but with many of the key elements heavily redacted. The documents came in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit filed by Judicial Watch against the U.S. Department of State and FBI on June 4, 2012.
Among the new revelations contained in the 79 pages of documents are the following:
The FBI had early suspicions about closer ties between Aulaqi and 9-11 hijacker Nawaf al-Hazmi than Aulaqi admitted: “This data suggests a more pervasive connection between al-Hazmi and Aulaqi than he [Aulaqi] admitted to during his interview with the FBI.”
The FBI had confirmed Aulaqi’s nexus with other FBI counter-terrorism investigations: “[Investigations] of Aulaqi reveal further links to other FBI International Terrorist investigations including … the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in the United States.”
The documents explicitly state that as far back as 2001, Omar al-Bayoumi was reportedly a Saudi intelligence agent: “An individual who has requested confidentiality has stated al-Bayoumi is believed to have worked for the Saudi Arabian Intelligence Service and reports on dissident Saudis in the U.S. Rental and other records indicate al-Bayoumi consistently indicated his occupation as a student.”
Several pages of heavily redacted investigative reports contain analysis of pen registers of al-Aulaqi calls. These include a reference to an al-Aulaqi nexus with the DEA investigation, as well as contacts between al-Aulaqi and al-Bayoumi: “DEA Analysts are continuing analysis of telephone call activity …” and al-Aulaqi “… was also involved in call activity with … San Diego PENTTBOM subject OMAR AL-BAYOUMI. AL-BAYOUMI cosigned the lease of an apartment rented by [terrorist hijackers] NAWAF ALHAZMI and KHALID ALMIHDHAR.”
Omar al-Bayoumi’s activities while in San Diego, California, were apparently on behalf of the government of Saudi Arabia according to an unidentified FBI source: al-Bayoumi disclosed “to others at the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD) he had friends or contacts at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California … [redacted] advised AL-BAYOUMI was extremely close to other ICSD Saudis … believed AL-BAYOUMI was in the United States on scholarship from the Saudi Airport Authority of Saudi Airlines ….” Saudi Airlines is the flag-carrying airline of Saudi Arabia.
Omar al-Bayoumi was one of dozens of other Saudis in the U.S. on similar arrangements: “[Redacted] identified AL-BAYOUMI as a ghost employee of AVCO Oversees … estimated that there were approximately fifty (50) individuals carried on the books and PCA or Dallah and being paid for doing nothing.” Dallah AVCO is headquartered in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
According to a New York Times article on a secret Congressional report in 2003, Omar al-Bayoumi, a Saudi national, was suspected of being a Saudi intelligence agent who may have reported to Saudi government officials. The article said that al-Bayoumi was employed by a contractor to the Saudi civil aviation authority, and received payments authorized by a Saudi official. According to the Times story, “The payments authorized by the Saudi official increased significantly after Mr. al-Bayoumi came in contact with the two hijackers in early 2000, the classified part of the report states.”
On September 11, 2013, Judicial Watch released surveillance reports and logs it had obtained from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) revealing that FBI agents trailed al-Aulaqi to the front doors of the Pentagon on the day he spoke as an invited guest at a Department of Defense luncheon. The day before the surveillance and luncheon, al-Aulaqi had been identified as a “terrorist organization member,” and an FBI alert had been issued reading, “Warning – approach with caution . . . Do not alert the individual to the FBI’s interest and contact your local FBI field office at the earliest opportunity.” [Emphasis added] Judicial Watch had previously obtained documents from the U.S. State Department indicating that the (FBI) was aware on September 27, 2001, that al-Aulaqi had purchased airplane tickets for three of the 9/11 terrorist hijackers, including mastermind Mohammed Atta. Subsequent to the FBI’s discovery, al-Aulaqi was detained and released by authorities at least twice.
“These documents suggest that there remain serious questions about what is obviously Saudi intelligence asset was doing in assisting the 9/11 hijackers,” said Judicial Watch President Tom Fitton. “As these newly released documents confirm, as far back as the 9-11 attacks, the FBI had substantial evidence that both al-Aulaqi and al-Bayoumi were involved in 9/11. Yet, neither was arrested, one was not punished for a dozen years, and the other still roams free. We intend to keep digging into this critical issue. It should cause concern that none of these questions were answered before Obama ordered al-Aulaqi’s controversial assassination.”
From the 16 July 2016 Huffington post
And as you read the 29 pages remember that they were written during 2002 and 2003.
President Bush did not want the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia investigated. President Bush has deep ties to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its royal family and only wanted to protect the Kingdom. President Bush wanted to go to war in Iraq — not Saudi Arabia. So, 29 full pages that said “Saudi” and “Bandar” instead of “Hussein” and “Iraq” was a huge problem for President Bush.
It is well documented that the Joint Inquiry received enormous push-back against its investigation into the Saudis. In fact, former FBI Director Mueller acknowledges that much of the information implicating the Saudis that the Inquiry investigators ultimately uncovered was unknown to him. Why does Mueller say this? Mostly because Mueller and other FBI officials had purposely tried to keep any incriminating information specifically surrounding the Saudis out of the Inquiry’s investigative hands. To repeat, there was a concerted effort by the FBI and the Bush Administration to keep incriminating Saudi evidence out of the Inquiry’s investigation. And for the exception of the 29 full pages, they succeeded in their effort.
Notwithstanding the lack of cooperation from the FBI and the pressure from the Bush Administration to thwart any investigation of the Saudis, the Joint Inquiry was still able to write 29 full pages regarding Saudi complicity in the 9/11 attacks. No other nation is given such singular prominence in the Joint Inquiry’s Final Report. Not Iraq. Not Iran. Not Syria. Not Sudan. Not even Afghanistan or Pakistan.
To be clear, the 9/11 Commission did NOT fully investigate the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Staff Director Philip Zelikow blocked any investigation into the Saudis. Zelikow even went so far as to fire an investigator who had been brought over from the Joint Inquiry to specifically follow-up on the Saudi leads and information uncovered in the Joint Inquiry. I will repeat — the investigator was fired. In addition, Zelikow re-wrote the 9/11 Commission’s entire section regarding the Saudi’s and their connection to the 9/11 attacks. Former 9/11 Commissioners John Lehman, Bob Kerrey, and Tim Roemer have all acknowledged that the Saudis were not adequately investigated by the 9/11 Commission. Thus, for any government official to hang their hat on the 9/11 Commission’s Final Report — when Commissioners, themselves, have admitted that the Saudis were not fully investigated, is absurd and disgraceful.
For example, one glaring piece of information was not mentioned in either the 9/11 Commission or the Joint Inquiry’s 29 pages — the information regarding Fahad Thumairy and Khallad bin Attash found in both an FBI report and a CIA report —that are now declassified. Both reports indicate that Fahad Thumairy — a Saudi Consulate official—helped bring Khallad bin Attash into the United States in June of 2000 so he could meet with two of the 9/11 hijackers, Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi. Thumairy escorted bin Attash — a known al Qaeda operative — through INS and Customs at LAX evading security and any possible alarm bells. Again, this information is found in both a CIA and FBI report.
Four months after Khallad bin Attash met with the two 9/11 hijackers in Los Angeles, the USS Cole was bombed and seventeen U.S. sailors were killed. Khallad bin Attash, Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi were all named as co-conspirators in the bombing of the USS Cole.
Where is the information regarding bin Attash and Thumairy? Has it ever been investigated? Had our intelligence agencies capitalized on the known connection between Thumairy and bin Attash, they would have been able to thwart the bombing of the USS Cole. In addition, they would have had access and the ability to weave together nearly all the pieces of the 9/11 attacks — more than nine months before the 9/11 attacks happened.
But as history shows, Saudi Consulate official Fahad Thumairy was not investigated and 17 sailors in addition to 3,000 others were killed.
Al-Bayoumi was probably born around 1959, but virtually nothing is known of al-Bayoumi’s early life. Until 1994 he lived in Saudi Arabia, working for the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation, a department headed by Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz.
In August 1994, al-Bayoumi moved to the United States and settled down in San Diego, California, where he became involved in the local Muslim community. He was very inquisitive, and was known to always carry around a video camera. According to several sources   (Newsweek 11/22/03, 11/24/03) , al-Bayoumi was strongly suspected by many residents of being a Saudi government spy. The man the FBI considered their “best source” in San Diego said that al-Bayoumi “must be an intelligence officer for Saudi Arabia or another foreign power,” according to Newsweek Magazine.
During this time, al-Bayoumi was in the United States as part of a work-study program. The Saudi General Authority of Civil Aviation paid al-Bayoumi’s salary through a government contractor. When the contractor proposed terminating its relationship with al-Bayoumi in 1999, a Saudi government official replied with a letter marked “extremely urgent” that the government wanted al-Bayoumi’s contract renewed “as quickly as possible.”  As a result, Al-Bayoumi’s employment with the project continued.
In June 1998, an anonymous Saudi philanthropist donated $500,000 to have a Kurdish mosque built in San Diego, on the condition that al-Bayoumi be hired as maintenance manager with a private office. The donation was accepted, but because al-Bayoumi rarely showed up for work, the mosque’s leadership became unhappy with him. Eventually, they moved to fire him.
Some time in late 1999 or early 2000, Omar al-Bayoumi began receiving another monthly payment–this one from Princess Haifa bint Faisal, the wife of Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador to the U.S. Checks for between $2,000 and $3,000 were sent monthly from the princess, through two or three intermediaries, to al-Bayoumi. The payments continued for several years, totaling between $50,000 and $75,000. According to the recent release of documents by 2002 Congressional Inquiry into Sept. 11 Attacks Omar al-Bayoumi was not the recipient of the checks Osama Bassnan wife was. He was a close associate of Omar al-Bayoumi, Bassan made comments to an FBI source “That he did more for the hijackers than al-Bayoumi did.” The report further states the even though the money was meant for Bassnan, al-Bayoumi’s wife had attempted to deposit three of the checks into her own account.